[學術討論會] Can Necessity be Understood in Terms of Essence?
臺大哲學系學術討論會公告
主講人：Prof. Gaétan Bovey
Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Philosophy, National Taiwan University
主 題：Can Necessity be Understood in Terms of Essence?
時 間：114年3月3日（週一）
下午15:30 – 17:30
地 點：臺灣大學水源校區哲學系館三樓 302室（台北市思源街18號）
歡迎參加討論，謝謝！
Seminar
Speaker: Prof. Gaétan Bovey
Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Philosophy, National Taiwan University
Title: Can Necessity be Understood in Terms of Essence?
Date: 15:30 – 17:30 pm, Monday, March 3, 2025
Venue: Conference Room 302, Department of Philosophy, ShuiYuan Campus, National Taiwan University (18, SiYuan Street, Taipei)
Abstract:
Essence and metaphysical necessity are two of the most fundamental concepts of contemporary metaphysics, and different accounts of what they consist in have been defended in the literature. Kripke’s seminal lectures paved the way for simple forms of modalism according to which essence is analyzable in terms of metaphysical necessity. Yet the popularity of such views has been severely undermined by a series of powerful counterexamples defended by Fine, who argues that necessity cannot be sufficient for essence. In response, one could try to improve modalism with, for instance, additional criteria that properties need to satisfy in order to be essential. But Fine thinks otherwise. He claims that the relation between essence and necessity should be understood the other way around: it is necessity that should be analyzed in terms of essence. Since the publication of Fine’s paper, different versions of this new variant of essentialism have emerged, and although they differ on some technical aspects, all agree on the following central idea: essence is the source of (and therefore explains) necessity. Despite its considerable impact in the literature, it is only recently that this claim has been challenged from different angles. The main aim of this talk is to highlight one of the substantial problems that Finean essentialism faces, namely that an explanatory gap is felt between essence and necessity. This problem calls into question the very intelligibility of Fine’s theory and, after explaining in detail why I think there is no viable option to bridge this gap (regardless of how one decides to understand or refine the theory), I will outline a different approach to the question of the source necessity, as well as offer a novel explanation of what kind of place essence occupies in the metaphysical structure of reality.